We consider fair allocation problems of dividing a social endowment of infinitely divisible goods among agents with equal rights to these resources. The first objective of this paper is to describe the implications of the three axioms (population monotonicity, resource monotonicity, and welfare domination under preference replacement) on the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. In a pure exchange economy, the Walrasian mechanism from equal division fails to satisfy resource monotonicity and welfare domination under preference replacement with homothetic preferences. Next, we impose three distributional criteria (equal division lower bound, no envy, and no domination) on general economic problems of fair division and investigate whether each criterion is compatible with the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. We mainly find that (i) in the absence of substitution effects the transfer paradox occurs if and only if the preference replacement paradox occurs and that (ii) in the presence of substitution effects in demand, the preference replacement paradox may occur even when the transfer paradox does not.
Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating a bundle of commodities among a group of agents who are collectively entitled to them. Perhaps the most widely advocated method of a fair division problem is the Walrasian mechanism from equal division: Each agent takes equal division of the social endowment and operates the Walrasian mechanism. First, we describe the implications of several axioms such as \population monotonicity", \re-source monotonicity", \welfare domination under preference replacement", \consistency", and \converse consistency" on the Walrasian mechanism from equal division.
A motivation for this paper is from Chinchilnisky and Thomson (1987) , which shows that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division violates population monotonicity in economies with homothetic preferences.
2 Population monotonicity (Thomson, 1983a) requires that upon the arrival of a new agent, all of the original agents should be affected in the same direction: all weakly gain or all weakly lose.
The Walrasian mechanism from equal division does not meet resource monotonicity and welfare domination under preference replacement (Moulin, 1987) . 3 The former requires that all agents should be affected in the same direction when the amount to divide changes: all weakly gain or all weakly lose as a result of any change in the amount to divide, whether it be an increase or a decrease. The latter requires that changes in the preferences of some members of the society should affect the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction: all weakly gain or all weakly lose.
We also study the properties of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division in conjunction with a succession of three other criteria to evaluate the fairness of the Walrasian equilibrium allocation. The first criterion is \equal division lower bound" (Steinhaus, 1948) : no agent should prefer equal division to her bundle. The second one is \no envy" (Foley, 1967) : no agent should prefer someone else's bundle to her own. The third one is \no domination" (Thomson, 1983b) : no agent should get at least as much of all goods, and more of at least one of them, than some other agent. We obtain the result that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division satisfies these three criteria. Dagan (1994) applies the consistency to generalized economies and proves that the Walrasian mechanism is consistent in that domain. This axiom requires that if a solution chooses a certain alternative for some problem, then for the \reduced" problem obtained by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their awards and reassessing the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining agents, the solution should assign to the latter the same payoffs as before. Dagan (1994) also proves that the Walrasian mechanism is converse consistent under a certain condition. Converse consistency may be interpreted as a decentralization axiom, which states that if for some problem, a feasible allocation has the property that for all proper subgroups of the agents it involves, the solution chooses the restriction of the alternative to the subgroup for the associated reduced problem this subgroup faces, then the allocation should be the solution outcome for the problem. Jones (1994) complements the Chinchilnisky and Thomson (1987) and it shows that in the absence of substitution effects the transfer paradox occurs if and only if the preference replacement paradox occurs and that in the presence of substitution effects in demand the preference replacement paradox may occur even when the transfer paradox does not. The conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox are more stringent than those for the preference replacement paradox.
Recently, Bowden (2013) demonstrates social learning has the effect on choosing political leaders in order to strengthen group solidarity. Even though the assumptions don't seem to be realistic, the characterization is very insightful. Lee (2014) shows that a tournament competition can induce the optimal incentive to work through any adverse effect of a tournament and when people deal with both competition and cooperation, there should be some positive effect on both. It is very similar to our analysis in the situation where efficiency and fairness are simultaneously determined.
We expand the previous problems to pure change economies with more than two agents. The first contribution is that applying homothetic preference in pure exchange economies, we show that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division fails to satisfy two monotonicity conditions, namely resource monotonicity and welfare domination under preference replacement. Secondly, we adapt three distributional criteria (equal division lower bound, no envy, and no domination) on general economic problems of fair division and investigate whether each criterion is compatible with the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. The findings are that in the context of the Walrasian mechanism, we found that in the absence of substitution effects, the transfer paradox occurs if and only if the preference replacement paradox occurs. And in the presence of substitution effects in demand, the preference replacement paradox may occur even when the transfer paradox does not.
The paper is constructed as follows. In Section 1, we clarify our problem and describe axiomatic research to verify all theorems. Section 2 defines all details of notations and axioms with the notations. In Section 3, we provide our main results regarding the Walrasian mechanism from equal division with fairness axioms and monotonicity axioms and the main findings are followed in Section 4. Conclusion follows in Section 5.
Preliminaries
The model is as follows. Let I / f1, 2, ..., ng be an (infinite) universe of potential agents. Agent i in I is indexed by subscript i. Let N be the collection of nonempty, finite subsets of I, whose elements are denoted by M and N. There are l commodities. Each agent i ! N is equipped with a preference relation on R l + , denoted by R i, P i denoting the strict preference relation associated with R i, and I i the indifference relation. Each preference relation R i is assumed to be continuous and convex. Let R be the class of preference relations. The symbol R denotes a list (Ri)i !N ! R N . We denote a social endowment by W ! R l + . A problem of fair division is a triple e = (N, R, W ). Let E be a class of economies. A feasible allocation is a list
. Let Z be the set of feasible al-
that associates with each economy e ! E a nonempty subset of Z. A solution provides for each economy a set of feasible allocations regarded as desirable for it. Now we introduce our main mechanism for the fair division problem which is popular with economists. The Walrasian mechanism from equal division translates social endowment into equal private ownership and operates the Walrasian mechanism.
Walrasian mechanism from equal division, W ed: For all e ! E ,
there is a vector p ! S l{1 , the (l{1)
dimensional simplex, such that for The pair (p, z) is referred to as a Walrasian equilibrium of e and in particular, z ! W ed( e) as the Walrasian equilibrium allocation from equal division. For each i i, z i maximizes R i over agent i's budget set
We will impose the following axioms, which are standard in the literature. The first axiom is efficiency requirement: Pareto efficiency requires that there be no feasible allocation at which all agents are weakly better off and at least one agent is strictly better off.
An allocation z ! Z(e) is Pareto efficiency for e ! E if there is no
Pareto efficiency: A solution j is Pareto efficient if for all e ! S, for all z ! j (e), z is Pareto efficient for e.
Our main axioms in the present study are as follows. Population monotonicity introduced in the context of bargaining theory, is now one of the standard axioms in the study of variable population models. When applied to the class of problems we are interested in, it says that upon the arrival of new agents, all of the original agents should be affected in the same direction: all weakly gain or all weakly lose together.
Population monotonicity: A solution is population monotonic if for
Resource monotonicity requires that changes in the social endowment should affect all of the original agents in the same direction: all weakly gain or all weakly lose.
Resource monotonicity: A solution is resource monotonic, if for all
Welfare domination under preference replacement requires that changes in the preferences of some members of the society should affect the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction: all weakly gain or all weakly lose.
Welfare domination under preference replacement: A solution meets the welfare domination under preference replacement, if for all M,
We introduce a new definition which will be used frequently. If there exists a certain allocation in the feasible set of some problem, we obtain a \reduced problem" by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their awards and reassessing the situation from the viewpoint of the remaining agents. In the current context, the reduced problem is defined by (i) the number of the remaining agents, (ii) their preference profile, and (iii) the sum of their allocations.
Let e = (N, R, W ) ! E , M Ì N, and x ! Z(e) be given. The reduced problem of e with respect to M and x is the economy r
We are also interested in the following fundamental notions of equity. The first notion is equal division lower bound, i.e., every agent should find his bundle at least as desirable as equal division.
5 R M means the preference profile (R i ) i ! M 6 Vector inequalities: given x, y ! R l + , x F y if x k F y k for all coordinate k; x $ y if x F y and x!y; x>y if x k >y k for all coordinate k Equal division lower bound: A solution j satisfies equal division lower bound if for all N ! N , all e ! E , and all z ! j (e), we have that
An alternative distributional requirement is that every agent should find his bundle at least as desirable as the bundle received by anyone else.
No envy (or envy free): A solution satisfies no envy if for all N ! N , all e ! E , and all z ! j (e), we have that z i R i z j for all i, j ! N.
No domination requires that no agent should get at least as much of all goods, and more of at least one of them, than some other agent.
No domination: A solution satisfies no domination if for all N ! N , all e ! E , and all z ! j (e), there are no i, j ! N such that z i ≥ z j.
3 Axiomatic properties of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division
We now investigate the implications of several axioms on the Walrasian mechanism operated from equal division. Before the main results, we must comment first whether the Walrasian equilibrium operated from equal division exists. Mas-Colell (1985) shows that in a pure exchange economy with perfectly divisible goods a Walrasian equilibrium exists if each individual preference is convex and continuous, and moreover, at least one of the two following assumptions holds: each agent is endowed with a positive amount of every good; all preferences are strictly monotonic. Since we assume that each preference relation R i is continuous and convex and each agent has W /|N |( > 0) initially, a Walrasian equilibrium from equal division exists.
In general, the Walrasian equilibrium is not unique. However, uniqueness of the Walrasian equilibrium is guaranteed if each individual preference satisfies the gross substitutability assumption: the quantity d i k of good k demanded by agent i is nondecreasing in p k0 for all k 0 ! k. Chinchilnisky and Thomson (1987) show that in economies with ho-mothetic preferences, there is a unique and stable Walrasian equilibrium from equal division. Thus, in economies with homothetic preferences, we accept the Walrasian mechanism from equal division as a solution.
3.1 Population monotonicity, resource monotonicity, and welfare domination under preference replacement
It is well-known that if preferences are monotonic for all i ! N, the Walrasian mechanism from equal division is Pareto efficient. First, we impose two monotonicity axioms on the Walrasian mechanism from equal division: Population monotonicity and the resource monotonicity.
An intuitive explanation for the phenomenon described here is that the tastes of the new agent, agent 3, are so biased in favor of the good sold by agent 1 that the price increase of that good caused by agent 3's arrival is more than enough to compensate the decrease in agent l's initial endowment. An increase in population has two effects on the welfare of agents at the Walrasian outcome. First, by decreasing equal division, it affects them negatively: this is an \income effect". It also impacts on their welfare by disturbing the equilibrium prices: this is a \substitution effect". For some agents, the direction of the substitution effect may be opposite to that of the income effect. The income effect only depends on population size. The substitution effect mainly depends on differences in preferences. So, if the initial population is sufficiently large and is composed of agents with sufficiently diverse preferences, and if the preferences of the new agents are sufficiently tilted towards a certain good, then the substitution effect may dominate the income effect: it is indeed the case, and as a result the Walrasian mechanism from equal division violates population monotonicity. The fact that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division fails population monotonicity is explained by an example.
Example 1 We take a numerical example in a two-good problem with four agents having Leontief-type preferences. Social endowments are W = (24, 24) and the preferences are represented by the following utilities: u 1 (x 1 y 1 ) = min f2x 1 +8, y 1 g, and = u i( x i y i) = min f18x 1 +100, 25y 1 +132g for 7 i's preference relation is monotonic if for all x i , y i , we have that fxi F y ig ) fxiRiyig and fxi>yig ) fxi R i y ig i = 2, 3, 4. The Walrasian mechanism from equal division is p = (3, 2), with associated correspondence: z 1 = (2, 12), and z i(22/3, 4) for i = 2, 3, 4. Next, remove agent 4 and compute the new competitive price p 0 = (2, 7), with correspondence: z 1 0 = (1, 10), and z i 0 = (23/2, 7) for i = 2, 3. Thus agent 1 is strictly worse off in every good for the three-agent problem but agent 3 and 4 are made better off.
Figure 1. Example 1
By Chinchilnisky and Thomson (1987) , we already know that in economies with homothetic preferences, there is a unique and stable Walrasian equilibrium from equal division. Thus, when we deal with a pure exchange economy with homothetic preferences, we accept the Walrasian mechanism from equal division as a solution following it. And we expand our focus to a pure exchange economy and assume agents have homothetic preferences. Now we start to verify the axiomatic properties of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division.
Lemma 1
The Walrasian mechanism from equal division does not satisfy resource monotonicity in economies with homothetic preferences.
Proof.
Given e = (N, R, W ) and e When social endowment changes, this also affects the equilibrium price, and each agent's welfare may be affected in opposite directions.
Next, we impose a kind of replacement axiom: welfare domination under preference replacement. Then the axiom or condition is not met with the Walrasian mechanism from equal division in a pure exchange economy with homothetic preferences.
Lemma 2 The Walrasian mechanism from equal division does not meet welfare domination under preference replacement in economies with homothetic preferences.
Given e = (N, R, W ) and e 0 = (M, R 0 , W ) where |N | = 3, R i = R i 0 for agents 1 and 2, and the social endowment W ! R 2 + , let z be a Walrasian equilibrium from equal division for e and z 0 for e 0 . When agent 3's preferences change, since z 1 0 is below the ray p 1 through z 1 , and z 2 0 is below the ray p 2 through z 2 by homothetic preference assumption, z 1 0 P 1 z 1 , and z 2 P 1 z 2 0 : agent 1 gains and agent 2 loses. Therefore, welfare domination under preference replacement fails.
Figure 3: Proof of Lemma 2
When the preferences of an agent change, this will typically affect the equilibrium prices, and if at least two of the other agents are initially on opposite sides of the market, their welfares will be affected in opposite directions.
Three criteria of fairness
We also prove some axiomatic properties of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division with some fairness axioms. But in this Theorem, we don't need to stick to a pure exchange economy.
Theorem 1 If a feasible allocation, z, is a Walrasian equilibrium allocation from equal division, then (i) it is envy free (it also satisfies no domination since no domination is a weaker criterion than no envy). (ii) it meets equal division lower bound.
Proof.
(i) We take an agent i ! N arbitrarily. By the definition of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division, we simply observe that z i, and maximizes his preference over the budget set B i = fzi 0 | p×z i 0 # p×W /|N |g. By the assumption of equal division, every agent has the same budget set. Then, z j ! B i and agent i cannot prefer z j over z i, for all j ! i. Since we choose agent i arbitrarily, z i R i z j for all i.
(ii) By the definition of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division, z i is maximal point in budget set
4 The transfer paradox and the preference replacement paradox
We know from Lemma 2 that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division does not satisfy the population monotonicity property. Even though new agents are invited to share social endowments and each initial endowment is reduced, it is possible to benefit some agents in the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. We will say that it is subject to the \pop-ulation paradox", which is pointed out by Thomson (1983a) . The population paradox is related to the phenomenon known in international trade as the \transfer paradox": it is sometimes possible for an agent to benefit from transferring to another agent part of his initial endowment prior to the operation of the Walrasian mechanism. Jones (1987) shows that the conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox and the population paradox are equivalent in the absence of substitution effects and that the conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox are more stringent than those for the population paradox in the presence of substitution effects.
We produce a new paradox from Lemma 2 which states that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division does not meet welfare domination under preference replacement. Even though changes in the preferences of some members of the society should affect the agents whose preferences have not changed in the same direction, it is possible to do good to some agents and to do harm to the others. In this case, we will say that it is subject to the \preference replacement paradox". Using the example by Jones (1987) , the next theorem compares the conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox with those for the preference replacement paradox.
Theorem 2 (i) In the absence of substitution effects the transfer paradox occurs if and only if the preference replacement paradox occurs. (ii) In the presence of substitution effects in demand the preference replacement paradox may occur even when the transfer paradox does not. The conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox are more stringent than those for the preference replacement paradox.
Benchmark Case: It is useful to start with a benchmark case. We restrict our discussion to the case of Leontief-type homothetic preferences. There are three agents: the Giver (G), the Receiver(R), the Uninvolved(U). R and U share identical preferences. This case is illustrated in figure 4. In the transfer exercise, G and U have the same amount of social endowment, W /2, while R has nothing. Before any transfer, the Walrasian equilibrium is (A, B, 0) for (G, U, R) respectively. Suppose that G makes a direct transfer of one-third of G's initial endowment bundle on to R. G shifts to the point W /3, while now R possesses W /6 and U's bundle is unaltered, W /2. If we want to keep G's real income unchanged, the budget line should rotate from I to L. G's consumption bundle remains at A, U's one is lowered from B to C, and R's one is shown by the point D, the allocation (A, C, D). In the preference replacement exercise, the Walrasian equilibrium allocation from equal division leads to (A, E, E). The allocation is on the brink of violating the welfare domination under preference replacement. (i) Case of the absence of substitution effects: It is easy to trace through the consequences of allowing the preferences for R and U to differ from each other. Suppose that R has preferences even more biased toward commodity Y than U. First, in the transfer exercise, a transfer creates an even greater demand for Y at initial prices than those in the benchmark case: the relative price of Y must rise by a greater amount than shown by the move from I to L in figure 4. With G's budget line rotating around his post-transfer endowment point, W /3, to a position flatter than L, G consumes more of both commodities than he did at A. Such a transfer has resulted in producing the paradox whereby the real income of G rises. Second, in the preference replacement exercise, the Walrasian mechanism from equal division produces the paradox if R has preferences even more biased toward commodity Y than U. Since, after R's preferences change through the steeper ray than U's, the price line should be flatter than L, G gains and R and U lose.
These results are summarized in figure 5 , where the transfer exercise and the preference replacement exercise are directly compared. The horizontal axis (my R ) shows possible values for the marginal propensity to consume commodity Y on the part of R. Real income for G is shown on the vertical axis (yG 0 ). The upward-sloping line labeled TT illustrates how a simple transfer of one-third of G's endowment bundle to R alters G's real income once the terms of trade adjust to clear commodity markets. The RR line represents how the real income of G changes as the marginal propensity to consume commodity Y on the part of R changes. As figure 5 reveals, if the marginal propensity to consume commodity Y on the part of R is larger than (my (ii) Case of the presence of substitution effects: In this two-commodity case the consequence of allowing some degree of substitutability in preference patterns is to moderate the required degree to which relative prices are affected by any shock to an existing equilibrium. We still stick to the Leontief-type homothetic preferences for G and R and suppose that only U's preferences are strictly convex to allow substitution effects. This case is illustrated in figure 6 . First, in the preference replacement exercise, R's consumption bundle should be at least E 2 to keep G's real income unaltered. The allocation (A, E 1 , E 2 ) is on the brink of violating the welfare domination under preference replacement. Only if R's marginal propensity to consume Y is larger than that of the ray passing the point E 2 from the origin, the preference replacement paradox occurs. Second, in the transfer exercise, after the same transfer as above is performed, G's consumption bundle should remain at A, and U's one be lowered from B to C 1 in the Walrasian mechanism to keep G's real income unaltered. That demonstrates that R's bundle should be D 3 = D+(C { C 1 ) to satisfy feasibility. The allocation (A, C 1 , D 3 ) is on the brink of producing the transfer paradox. Since D 3 and D 2 are on the line L 1 and D 3 is on the left side of Figure 6 . Proof of Theorem 2 D 2 , the ray passing through the point D 3 from the origin is steeper than that passing through both E 2 and D 2 from the origin. It means that the transfer paradox does not occur even though the preference replacement paradox occurs. Therefore, the conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox are more stringent than those for the preference replacement paradox.
These results are summarized in figure 7 , where the upward-sloping line labeled T figure 7 represents that R's Leontief-type preference patterns with the ray passing through E 2 in figure 6 restore G's real income sufficiently in the preference replacement exercise of the presence of substitution effects. The situation demonstrates that in the presence of substitution effects R's marginal propensity to consume Y should be larger than that in the absence of substitution effects. By the proof of the part (ii) of Theorem 2, f should be on the right side of the point e. 
Concluding remarks
We have analyzed the axiomatic properties of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. First, it is Pareto efficient under the assumption of monotonic preferences. Second, it violates population monotonicity, resource monotonicity, and welfare domination under preference replacement. Third, it meets the criteria of no envy and equal division lower bound [N1] . In the context of the Walrasian mechanism, we have shown that in the absence of substitution effects the transfer paradox can occur if and only if the preference replacement paradox occurs and that in the presence of substitution effects in demand the preference replacement paradox may occur even when the transfer paradox does not. The conditions for the emergence of the transfer paradox are more stringent than those for the preference replacement paradox.
It is quite remarkable that the Walrasian mechanism from equal division has guided allocation decisions in so many different historical contexts, and very natural to infer that it must have special properties that no other solution satisfies. However, in general, a variety of fruitful axiomatic studies often result in \characterization theorems". They are theorems identifying a particular solution or perhaps a family of solutions, as the only solution or family of solutions, satisfying a given list of axioms. A characterization is the most useful if it offers an explicit description of the solution. An example in this paper is Theorem 2. Whatever reasons we have of being interested in the Walrasian mechanism from equal division, we provide some of the significant characterizations of the Walrasian mechanism from equal division. Furthermore, the full characterization would be very helpful to understand the Walrasian mechanism from equal division.
We have mainly restricted our discussion to homothetic preferences. It is also useful to apply other preference patterns to the theorems. An example is the problem under quasi-linear preferences. It is also important to understand how a characterization is affected by enlarging or restricting the domain of problems under consideration. For example, instead of dealing with pure exchange economies only, one could allow for production to take place. A study of private goods production economies from the view-Varian, H. R., \Equity, envy, and efficiency," Journal of economic theory 9 (1), 1974, 63-91.
